

# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*



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## Party Platforms Agree On Major Foreign Policy Aims

WASHINGTON—Despite temptations to the contrary in the Presidential campaign year, the Republican and Democratic parties are acting once more on the belief that they can serve themselves and their country best in maintaining a united front where foreign policy is concerned. At present the candidates and other leaders of the two major parties are disposed not to make an issue of events and conduct in this field any more than they did in 1944, when Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, then as now the Republican nominee, helped President Franklin D. Roosevelt put over the Dumbarton Oaks Conference on United Nations organization. This attitude is not completely one of renunciation on the part of the Republicans. It amounts to their acceptance of a foreign policy conceived by a Democratic administration but developed with the collaboration of a few strong Republican leaders, notably Dewey himself, his foreign affairs adviser, John Foster Dulles, Chairman Arthur H. Vandenberg of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Chairman Charles Eaton of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The principal reason for the survival of this bipartisan arrangement into 1948 lies in a desire to show the Soviet Union that a large majority of Americans support the Federal government's efforts to contain the spread of Russian influence.

### Political Platforms

The two major parties registered their essential agreement in the foreign policy planks in the respective platforms that

they adopted at their recent conventions. Both support the United Nations and recommend curtailment of the right to use the veto. Both call for continuation of foreign aid programs, the Democrats stressing the "humanitarian" administration of the Marshall plan, the Republicans underlining "businesslike and efficient" administration. Both in effect approve the existing reciprocal trade program; the present Republican leadership has thrown over the party's traditional attachment to the protective tariff. Both propose that the United States give full recognition to the new state of Israel, whose *de facto* existence President Truman recognized on May 15.

Whatever criticism respecting foreign policy each party makes of the other in the platforms is minor. The Republicans took the Administration to task for vacillating on the problem of Palestine last winter, when first it encouraged, then discouraged, and at length again encouraged the United Nations to intervene there. The Democratic plank reported that the Republicans had "crippled" the reciprocal trade program in the Eightieth Congress, which in June reduced from three years to one year the duration of the President's authority to lower or raise the tariff in negotiating commercial agreements. The Democrats took credit in their platform for the existence of the foreign policy which the Republicans helped them to put into effect. Momentarily, this threatened interparty harmony. Governor Dewey expressed the opinion to newspaper reporters that the Democratic platform contained

"extremely partisan and provocative assertions concerning foreign affairs." But Mr. Dulles smoothed the rift in a visit to Washington late in July. As an earnest of its faith in bipartisanship, the Democratic administration on August 5 appointed Mr. Dulles to be one of the four United States representatives at the third session of the United Nations General Assembly, which opens in Paris on September 24.

### Future of Bipartisanship

The existence of the bipartisan arrangement almost eliminates the possibility of public disagreement by subordinate members of the major parties on foreign policy questions. Yet the subtle threat of potential disagreement remains so formidable that the Administration sometimes has hesitated to espouse openly certain lines of action which are desirable to bolster existing policy. For example, it has not pushed the idea that the United States should provide arms for Western European countries, from fear that the silent dissenters could cause its rejection in Congress. Should the country return to full and free discussion of foreign policy in the political arena, it might come out that these dissenters lack the popular support which the Administration sometimes assumes they possess, since the American people have indicated over and over during the past four years that they want no more of isolationism. Perhaps critical examination of the claims made for bipartisanship would disclose that it provides brakes as well as steam for foreign policy.

BLAIR BOLLES

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# Russia Consolidates Control of Danube at Belgrade

The Danubian conference which has been meeting in Belgrade since July 31 has not proved to be the favorable augury for a forthcoming discussion of Germany by the Big Four that many observers believed it would be. Russia and the Western Powers, instead of working out a compromise on the rules governing navigation on the Danube, are merely restating their opposing views, and Russia is using its 7 to 3 majority at the conference to defeat every proposal made by the West.

## Economics and Politics

The conflict between Russia and the West at Belgrade is no mere disagreement over technical details. It is rather a struggle for political power in which economic weapons are being used. The chief reason, therefore, that the United States, Britain and France are now pressing for the creation of a Danubian control commission in which the great powers as well as the riparian states would be represented is that this kind of administration would give the Western Allies at least a small voice in Southeastern Europe. The economic advantages which would accrue to the Western Powers if they succeeded in securing such a body would be very small. In the case of the United States, which has never had any ships on the Danube and has no plans for sending any there in the future, economic benefits derived from broad international control of the river would be practically nonexistent, except insofar as the growth of East-West trade would benefit this country. For the other Western Powers the material gains might be somewhat greater, since their ships formerly carried cargoes on the river. Moreover, a commission including Western representatives might honor the debts of the prewar Danubian Commission to Britain and France. But eager though both

the British and French may be to overlook no possible sources of income in their present straitened circumstances, they, too, are interested in establishing a broad international commission primarily as a means of maintaining their prestige in Eastern Europe.

From Russia's point of view the Danube appears as a broad highway leading directly from the West into the Soviet security sphere, and Moscow is determined to monopolize the river and to make it impossible for the Western Powers to use it. Accordingly, Andrei Y. Vishinsky, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, proposed, on August 2, a draft convention for the future regime of the Danube which, in effect, would legalize Russia's present position as mistress of the Danube from just below Linz, in Austria, to the Black Sea.

## Russian Control Assured

The Soviet draft convention, after paying lip service to the principle of "free navigation" which was written into the Axis satellite peace treaties by the Big Four, lists several provisions that would enable Russia to continue the control of the river it gained during the final phase of the war. Thus the Russian draft specifically excludes nonriparian states from the future Danubian Commission, and confines its membership to those seven Danubian states which now have Communist governments: Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union. Germany is not mentioned in the draft, and Austria, according to an annex, should enter the commission only after the question of an Austrian treaty has been settled. This provision might, of course, make it possible for Russia to hold out the chance of membership on the commission to Austria as a reward for the establish-

ment of a more "friendly" government than the present pro-Western regime in Vienna. At any rate, this is an interpretation which is certain to occur to many Austrians, particularly since Vishinsky administered one of his famous verbal lashings to the Austrian delegate and accused him of having belonged to the group which prepared Austria for the Anschluss.

Russia's domination of the Danube is further assured by the provision in the Soviet draft for the establishment of a special administration for the mouth of the river in which only the two riparian states—Rumania and Russia—would be represented. Finally, the draft would legalize and perpetuate the existence in the Danubian countries of the mixed Soviet navigation companies which Russia formed by means of its claims to "German assets." Since these companies control most of the port facilities and barges on the river, they virtually eliminate the possibility of any competition.

Russia's proposals for a Danubian Commission seem certain to win acceptance at Belgrade by a vote of 7 to 3. And once accepted, the Russian-sponsored convention will probably not prove subject to review by the Big Four, since the Council of Foreign Ministers failed to lay down a requirement to this effect when they called for a Danubian conference in their resolution of December 1946. When the present Belgrade conference ends, therefore, Russia will have advanced another step toward complete control of the Danube. The only remaining obstacle to total domination of the river will then be furnished by the United States, which temporarily finds itself a Danubian power because of the presence of its armies of occupation in Western Austria and Southern Germany.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

# International Communism Hits Nationalist Snags

The clash between Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and the Cominform which has been making headlines this summer is the most dramatic, but by no means the only example of the snags hit by international communism as it attempts to mould the national patterns of various nations. The failure of the Italian Communists to win the victory they had anticipated in the national elections of April 18 has since then been overshadowed by renewed unrest in Italy, especially following the at-

tempted assassination of the Communist leader, Palmiro Togliatti, on July 14 by a young Sicilian, Antonio Pallante. But the de Gasperi government, although it has lost some ground in popular favor because of the paucity, to date, of effective social and economic reforms, has succeeded in maintaining order; and, in spite of a wave of strikes, there have been indications that Italian workers may be growing weary of continued turmoil.

In Finland, only recently a target of

Russian pressure, the Popular Democratic Union led by the Communists lost 39,000 votes and 14 Diet seats in the first general election since 1945 held on July 1 and 2. A Social Democratic government headed by Karl A. Fagerholm has since been formed. From Czechoslovakia, following an initial period of seemingly passive acceptance of the Communist coup, increasing signs of unrest are being reported. Disaffection is inspired in part, at least, by deterioration in economic conditions

due to the government's attempts to restrict trade with the West. The open defiance of the Sokol groups in July received world-wide notice. More indicative of the difficulties experienced by the Czech Communists in a country which had had a longer tradition of democracy than any of its Eastern European neighbors is the rumored split within Communist ranks. President Klement Gottwald, a former Social Democratic left-winger who has sought to weld the Social Democrats into the Communist program, is said to be regarded by the Cominform as too pro-Western in his orientation, and possibly too independent; he might be replaced by some Communist less susceptible to Czechoslovakia's national interests.

### Titoism or Communism?

But while reaction against Communist domination and intramural strife in Communist ranks are still in an early stage in other nations where communism had made headway during and after the war, in Yugoslavia they have assumed a fairly clear-cut form. Reports so far available—most of them fragmentary and highly colored by the partisan passions of the sources from which they emanate—reveal five main points which are important with respect both to Yugoslavia's future, and to the future of communism outside Russia. First, it seems clear that Marshal Tito's defiance of the excommunication directed against him by the Cominform has rallied to his side not only many Yugoslav Communists, but also groups of the population which had previously opposed his regime. In this sense, his resistance to the Cominform has proved a unifying national factor in a country whose disparate elements—Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins—had been brought into a single state only after World War I.

Second, all reports indicate that one of the main reasons—possibly the principal one—why Tito fell into disfavor with the Cominform was his reluctance to alienate the peasants who form a majority of the population and who, having had far more extensive experience with private ownership of land than Russian peasants in 1917, vigorously opposed agricultural collectivization. Similar problems of agrarian

policy have arisen in Hungary, where the Rev. Zoltan Tildy, President of the People's Republic of Hungary, abdicated late in July. This indicates the difficulty of applying integrally the system developed in Russia to other nations, even those like Yugoslavia where conditions are in some respects comparable to those of Russia in the early days of the Soviet government. It should be noted, in this connection, that the Croats, who had lived within the Austro-Hungarian empire before its break-up in 1918, had been long exposed to Western influence.

Third, Yugoslavia has found it impossible to obtain from Russia tools and machinery required for its economic reconstruction program, and must seek them in the West, even at the risk of Moscow's criticism.

### Nationalism vs. Communism

Fourth, the national and territorial conflicts that have traditionally caused the Balkans to be regarded as the cockpit of Europe, although temporarily obscured by internal political struggles, have not been obliterated by communism. The evidence on this point is still largely in the form of undocumented rumors. But it would appear that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, which seemed to have been brought together by their Communist regimes and their common orientation toward Russia, have clashed again over the perennial issue of Macedonia; and that the re-emergence of this issue conceivably disrupted such aid as the Slav countries may have been giving the Greek guerrillas. General Markos, Greek guerrilla leader, is said to have promised Greek Macedonia to Tito—a gesture not appreciated by the Bulgarians. Communist co-operation across national frontiers, moreover, was put to a hard test by the issue of Trieste—for clearly if Trieste could be won by the Italian Communists it would be chalked up as a loss to the Communists of Yugoslavia.

Fifth—and perhaps most significant for the United States—the fact that Tito, for whatever reasons, has incurred the disfavor of the Cominform does not appear to have weakened either his adherence to Communist doctrine, or his recognition that Yugoslavia must remain in the orbit

of its powerful Russian neighbor. On the contrary, Tito made it clear to the first congress of the Yugoslav Communist party held since 1921, which opened in Belgrade on July 21, that he considered himself a true interpreter of Marxism. And his followers, while expressing willingness to develop economic ties with the West, provided no political conditions are attached by the United States, vowed loyalty to the U.S.S.R. It may well be that communism, which even in Russia has been far from monolithic, revealing again and again internal fissions denounced as Right and Left "deviations," will prove increasingly unable to avoid adaptations by its disciples abroad to the conditions of the countries over which they rule. The various Communist parties may then take on marked national colorations, while still maintaining their support both of communism and of Russia.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

*Depression Decade: From New Era through New Deal, 1929-1941*, by Broadus Mitchell. New York, Rinehart, 1947. \$5.50

The author finds that the depression had its origin in the economic aftermath of World War I. Hoover's depression policies are appraised and found wanting; it is noted, however, that in several particulars, the Republicans anticipated the New Deal. Discussing the London Economic Conference of 1933, Dr. Mitchell criticizes President Roosevelt for not developing a program for world co-operation at that parley.

*Defeat in the West*, by Milton Shulman. New York, Dutton, 1948. \$4.50

On the basis of many interviews with high-ranking German army officers, the author relates what is in effect the Nazi version of the war in the West. The thesis of the generals is that they were merely executing the orders of Hitler, who claimed that his intuition was an infallible guide. They would have the German people believe that, had Hitler given the field commanders a free hand, the outcome would have been different.

*The Man in the Street*, by Thomas A. Bailey. New York, Macmillan, 1948. \$5.00

A pioneer attempt to correlate the "what" and the "why" of American thinking on foreign affairs that ends with a convincing plea for more education of the electorate in matters pertaining to foreign policy.

*The New Foundation of International Law*, by Jorge Americano. New York, Macmillan, 1947. \$2.50

According to the author, professors of international law would perform a greater service in teaching that morals are the same under domestic and international law, instead of basing their instruction on overemphasized sovereignty.

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# Citizens and Foreign Policy

## V Membership and Finances

It is clear that a well organized community center of citizens' education in world affairs is a major project, thoroughly justified by the critical times in which we live. It should likewise be evident that a membership lecture association, with a limited number of subscribers, who may or may not read FPA publications, does not provide alone an adequate educational medium for present-day needs. The citizens' stake in foreign policy is too momentous for anything other than a major community project. Unless we mean business on new terms, in keeping with the colossal urgency of the times, we might as well close up shop.

The outline of membership programs and community services appearing in the preceding article illustrates the extent of the community task. While the mechanism and procedures involved must of necessity be modified according to the size of the community concerned, the scope of the subject matter is still applicable in all cases. The "One World" concept is no longer a theory but a living fact. The small community has at least one advantage over larger urban centers in that it can treat of that fact by the simple and effective medium of the town meeting.

The real problem of organization, therefore, arises in larger communities in which the device of an international center becomes necessary for the development of adequate membership programs as the basis for adequate community-wide educational services. The basic reason for the breakdown of membership programs to include specific geographic and world problem groupings is the wider appeal given to disparate groups and individuals having special interests and abilities. It is natural that experience, background or professional following should stimulate particular concern in the affairs of different geographic regions of the globe or on broader problems of world government, trade and economics. Similarly the multiplication of types of activities within the over-all program, such as discussion groups, seminars, clinics and related projects, enables more people to be active in the affairs of the community center and to have a sense of contributing to its well-being in matters of individual concern. As a people we are obviously moving away from the "spectator phase" of our past provincialism into a period of growing in-

dividual desire to get down into the arena and assume responsibilities for the affairs of mankind. Any community center which can provide this sense of fulfillment will largely solve its membership problem.

Even with the solution of the membership problem, however, the question of finances still remains. No community center can be self-supporting financially on the basis of membership fees alone. As it grows in importance it will be discovered that the proportion of its budget depending upon special gifts and donations will continue to increase. The financial problem, therefore, is one which has to be faced on new and unaccustomed terms, particularly since it has been the practice in the past to look upon small membership fees as the sole source of revenue.

In communities where the financial problem gives promise of being solved, certain common sources of revenue are clearly evident. In each case the association or council concerned is, of course, tax exempt as an educational institution, gifts being deductible thereby for tax purposes. The revenues over and above membership fees come not only from gifts, large and small, by private individuals, but likewise through corporations and other business concerns. In many cases grants are made for specific purposes such as public school and foreign student programs, radio education, international trade information, library development, and so forth. In some cities there is a Sponsors' Committee composed of individuals contributing \$100 a year or over, for whom special programs are likewise arranged. In several cases there are community endowments or private foundations to which successful appeals are made for special grants.

It is impossible to set a standard pattern of financing. Communities differ too widely in circumstances both as to size, character of population and business and commercial interests. All, however, have one common characteristic, that any worthy civic project, provided it has the proper leadership and gives promise of fulfilling a recognized community need, will always achieve the necessary support. A distinguished fund raising firm recently published a brochure entitled "Good Will Through Successful Fund Raising." This might well be adopted as the motto of our community projects in meeting the challenge of "Citizens and Foreign Policy."

BROOKS EMEY

## News in the Making

*Consultation on military affairs between the United States and the Brussels Treaty powers* was implemented when representatives of the American armed forces arrived in London last June to associate themselves on a nonmember basis with the Permanent Military Committee of the Western European Union. . . . *A new phase in the presently embittered economic relations between Argentina and the United States* may begin as a result of the current visit of Ambassador James Bruce to Washington. Mr. Bruce, caught in the cross fire between the State Department, ECA, and the Argentine administration, is reported to be seeking precise instructions as to whether the United States will locate wheat purchases in Argentina, and, if so, on what terms. . . . *The financial agreement recently negotiated between Britain and India* represents a compromise between India's requirements for development of its productive capacity and Britain's ability to release sterling and hard currency. No final settlement, it provides for extension of the 1947 agreement on sterling balances until 1951. In the two-year period, 1949-1951, Britain will release up to £40 million each year; while in the twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1948, India agrees to limit expenditures in hard-currency areas, for which it must draw on the central reserves of the sterling bloc, to the equivalent of £15 million. . . . *Panama's political outlook* was not lightened by the departure of Presidential candidate Arnulfo Arias on August 4. Dr. Arias went into exile—for the second time in a decade—after the national electoral board accorded victory in the hotly contested May 9 elections to the administration candidate, Domingo Díaz Arosemena, by the narrow margin of slightly over 1,000 votes.

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